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ABSTRACT 
In recent political-economic theories of ‘nature,’ Mill and Marx/Engels form important reference points. Ecological 
economists see Mill’s ‘stationary state’ as seminal, while Marxists have ‘brought capitalism back in’ to debates on 
growth and climate change, sparking a Marxological renaissance that has overturned our understanding of 
Marx/Engels’ opus. This essay explores aspects of Mill’s and Marx/Engels’ work and contemporary reception. It 
identifies a resemblance between their historical dialectics. Marx’s communism is driven by logics of ‘agency’ and 
‘structure’ (including the ‘tendency of profit rates to fall’). In Mill’s dialectic a ‘thesis,’ material progress, calls forth 
its ‘antithesis,’ diminishing returns. The inevitable ‘Aufhebung’ is a stationary state of wealth and population; Mill 
mentions countervailing tendencies but fails to consider their capacity to postpone utopia’s arrival. Today, Mill’s 
schema lives on in ecological economics, shorn of determinism but with its market advocacy intact. It appears to 
contrast with the ‘productive forces expansion’ espoused by Marx/Engels. They stand accused of ‘Promethean 
arrogance,’ ignoring ‘natural limits’ and ‘gambling on abundance.’ But I find these criticisms to be ill-judged, and 
propose an alternative reading, arguing that their work contains a critique of the ‘growth paradigm,’ and that their 
‘cornucopian’ ends do not sanction ‘promethean’ means. 
 
That Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill inhabited the same city for over twenty years without 
encountering one another has prompted some of their admirers to compensate for the 
frustration of this event’s unfortunate non-occurrence by means of fantasy. In Democracy: 
Crisis and Renewal, Paul Ginsborg (2008) conjures up two vigorous yet generally affable 
discussions between the two Victorian radicals. One, set in London in 1873, focuses upon 
democracy; the other is located in ‘heaven’ in 2008 and takes as its subject the worldly events 
unfolding below. Amartya Sen (2006) has likewise imagined meeting Mill and Marx in the 
afterworld, although he envisions the debate as proceeding more combatively, with his own 
avatar even feeling compelled to hide “behind an old-fashioned air raid shelter” to shield 
itself against the collateral damage. A more common enterprise has been to compare the 
work of the two thinkers, and treatises of this nature have been published on their theories 
of social conflict, on value theory, on equality, democracy and socialism. But such 
contributions have not been advanced on two interrelated issues that are of pressing concern 
in the current epoch: humanity’s relationship to nature, and the means and ends of 
economic growth. 
Both authors are important reference points in recent literature—academic and 
otherwise—on the political economy of ‘nature.’ Indeed, one of the welcome contributions of 
ecological economics, as it has developed over the last forty years, is that it has disinterred 
some of the ideas of classical political economy.1 Herman Daly (1977), for example, 
commends Malthus and Mill as one of the thinkers from whom we still have the most to 
learn. Daly is representative of a trend that commenced in the early 1970s, to frame solutions 
to problems of environmental degradation and resource depletion in the form of Mill’s 
‘stationary state’—otherwise known as the ‘no-growth economy’ or ‘equilibrium state’ 
(Boulding 1973: 89; Meadows et al 1972: 171-5). Marx and Engels’ critique of growth, and 
their theorisation of society-nature relations, have also received increasing attention in 
recent years. The 1980s and 1990s saw the publication of several books that developed 
                                                     
1  In a companion essay, Dale (2012b), I assess the work and influence on ecological thought of two other classical 
economists: Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. 
Marxist approaches to ecological theory, notably David Harvey’s Justice, Nature and the 
Geography of Difference and Carolyn Merchant’s Radical Ecology.2 In recent years new 
publications have come thick and fast, with Jonathan Neale’s Stop Global Warming (2008), 
Paul Burkett’s Marxism and Ecological Economics (2009), Chris Williams’ Ecology and Socialism, 
Peter Radt’s Fetisch Wachstum, John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark and Richard York’s The 
Ecological Rift (all 2010), and, in 2011, Jonas Rest’s Grüner Kapitalismus?, Ian Angus and 
Simon Butler’s Too Many People?, Max Koch’s Capitalism and Climate Change, and Patrick 
Bond’s Politics of Climate Justice. These authors have simultaneously ‘brought capitalism back 
in’ to academic and lay debates on population, economic growth and climate change and 
have contributed to a Marxological renaissance that has led to important modifications in 
our conception of the Marx-Engels opus. In the latter regard, Bellamy Foster’s Marx’s Ecology 
(2000) was the ground-breaking text. 
In this article I assess the work of Mill and Marx/Engels, and their contemporary 
reception. I explore their contribution to ecological political economy and survey the work 
of their contemporary devotees insofar as it relates to them. With regard to Mill, I identify a 
contradiction between the flourishing current interest in his ‘stationary state’ and the 
relative paucity of sober critical scrutiny, let alone philological inquiry, that has 
accompanied it. As to Marx and Engels, I interpret their work as a critique of growth, and 
suggest that their ‘cornucopian’ goals do not sanction ‘promethean’ means. 
John Stuart Mill and the dialectic of social progress 
 
In his Principles of Political Economy Mill performs an eyecatching manoeuvre. The textbook’s 
initial passages adopt a familiar Whiggish tone, praising the “civilized nations” for their 
economic progress, which is characterised by “the perpetual, and … unlimited, growth of 
man’s power over nature” (1994: 66) and which affords scope “for an indefinite increase of 
capital, production, and population” (1994: 67-8). But it then backtracks, with a paean to the 
stationary state. Mill’s thesis, notes Sheldon Wolin (1960: 321), represents a remarkable 
“inversion of one of the basic liberal postulates concerning history: instead of the belief that 
moral and intellectual progress depended upon unceasing material advance, true progress 
was identified with the stage when material growth had ceased.” Less remarkable in his day 
but more so in ours is that Mill presents the termination of material growth as not only 
desirable but inevitable. 
 To an extent, Mill was picking up threads present in Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo. 
Under their guidance, political economy was being fashioned around the inescapable 
imperative of scarcity and the law of diminishing returns, the corollaries of which were 
“progressive impoverishment, the stunting of growth, and the possibility of reaching a 
stationary state” (Escobar 1995: 63). The latter was for them, in Daly’s concise summary 
(2007: 117), 
 
a real condition toward which the economy was tending as increasing population, diminishing 
returns, and increasing land rents squeezed profits to zero. Population would be held constant 
by subsistence wages and a high death rate. Capital stock would be held constant by a lack of 
inducement to invest resulting from zero profits thanks to rent absorbing the entire surplus 
which was itself limited by diminishing returns. 
 
However, the stationary state figures in their thought only as a probable, and probably 
unpleasant, eventual destination, and all of them held out the prospect that technical 
                                                     
2  James O’Connor’s Essays in Ecological Marxism deserves mention too, as do Elmar Altvater’s The Future of the Market, 
Ted Benton’s The Greening of Marxism, and Paul Burkett’s Marx and Nature. 
advance would postpone its arrival, perhaps indefinitely. Smith (1993:81, 91) held that some 
countries—he mentions China and Holland—may have already acquired their “full 
complement of riches,” but he does not advocate this as an ideal, for life in a stationary state 
would be “dull.” Ricardo (1973: 63) gave greater definition to the tendencies leading toward 
the stationary state but he regarded it as a “far distant” prospect, and even this is a comment 
made in passing, buried within a diatribe against the poor laws. Malthus, although—
famously—the most pessimistic of the three, considers the possibility of stationary 
economies but insists that in the right conditions a country could “go on increasing in riches 
and population for hundreds, nay, almost thousands of years” (Malthus, 1989a: 437, 1989b: 
43). 
 Mill drew upon his predecessors’ theorems and speculations but knitted them 
together to construct a far-reaching and rigorous historical law. In essence, his is a dialectical 
formula that identifies a ‘thesis’, material progress, which calls into existence its ‘antithesis’, 
the law of diminishing returns, eventuating in the sublation of both trends in the stationary 
state. If the core of the ‘antithesis’ is the law of diminishing returns—which he hailed as “the 
most important proposition in political economy”—it contains in addition three subsidiary 
theses that, in combination, permit the prediction that the “kind of social progress 
characteristic of our present civilization” tends inexorably to reduce profit rates to a 
minimum (Mill 1994: 105-7). First, with increasing security of property, investment risk 
declines and consequently the level of profit deemed necessary to compensate for risk; 
second, as individuals gain maturity their capacity to defer gratification blossoms, resulting 
in declining consumerism and lower demand; third, as the world market becomes saturated 
and fewer ‘new countries’ enter it, opportunities for capital export decline.3 With profit rates 
on an unstoppable downward trajectory, and with population growth pressing against 
Malthusian limits, a stationary state of ‘wealth’ and population is ineluctable destiny. 
 For Mill’s admirers his critique of the Ellenbogengesellschaft—a social order in which 
the normal condition of life is “struggling to get on,” with much “trampling, crushing, 
elbowing, and treading on each other’s heels” (Mill, in Hamilton and Denniss 2005: 172; see 
also Hamilton 2003 Chapter 1)—elicits unreserved praise, alongside his portrayal of the 
more comfortable life that its antithesis, the stationary state, will allow.4 In such a society, 
Mill ventures, technical progress would facilitate increased leisure time—unlike in the 
existing system in which it “serves no purpose but the increase of wealth.” The social 
hierarchy would not be abolished but its gradient would be gentle. 
 
Society would exhibit these features: a well-paid and affluent body of labourers; no enormous 
fortunes …; but a much larger body of persons than at present, not only exempt from the 
coarser toils, but with sufficient leisure […] to cultivate freely the graces of life, and afford 
examples of them to the classes less favourably circumstanced for their growth (Mill 1994: 129). 
 
It would, in addition, feature a stationary population. In support of this proposition, Mill 
adduces a mix of arguments. Some are ‘environmental’ in character. In one passage he 
reasons (1994: 129) that the “unlimited increase of wealth and population” necessitates the 
cultivation of “every rood of land” and the ploughing of “every flowery waste or natural 
pasture”, which leaves no room for human satisfaction in contemplating the “spontaneous 
activity of nature.” It is, he adds (1994: 128), “not good for man to be kept perforce at all 
times in the presence of his species,” for a world “from which solitude is extirpated, is a very 
poor ideal.” Mill’s other arguments concerning population are Malthusian. He was 
                                                     
3 This third point echoes Sismondi and anticipates Hobson and Luxemburg. 
4 On ‘trampling,’ Mill’s most recent biographer remarks: “It was easy for Mill to say this. His comfortable, highly paid 
job at the East India Company, obtained through his father, exempted him from the need for any trampling or elbowing” 
(Reeves 2007: 224). 
profoundly influenced by Malthus, commending the Surrey parson’s population principle as 
a “great doctrine,” one which he himself pursued “with ardent zeal”—even to the point of 
spending a night in jail for distributing birth control pamphlets (Mill 1909: 71; see also 
Collini 1993: 312). Yet Mill’s Malthusianism was decidedly unorthodox. His identification of 
population growth “in the backward countries of the world” as legitimate, in contrast to the 
“advanced” countries where a “stricter restraint on population” is required (Mill 1994: 127), 
would raise eyebrows among Malthus’ disciples today. And his argument for zero 
population growth rested in part on the claim that it would permit higher living standards. 
The social purpose of family planning was the achievement of “full employment at high 
wages to the whole labouring population through a voluntary restriction of the increase of 
their numbers” (Mill 1909: 71)—a goal of which the Surrey parson would hardly have 
approved. 
 Mill’s thoughts on the stationary state attracted little comment from economists—
Maynard Keynes, Kenneth Boulding and Lewis Mumford apart—until the 1970s. But since 
that decade it has become a common point of reference. As noted above, Daly (1977, 2007) 
cites Mill as a guiding star, as do numerous other ecology-minded economists (Rist, 2011). 
The Australian eco-philosopher Clive Hamilton (2003: xiv, 223-5, 231) commends to his 
readers a Millian Eden: a society guided by a “post-growth political philosophy of 
eudemonism,” one that would “no longer worship” its industrialists and entrepreneurs and 
would cease to “sacrifice social justice and the environment on the altar of corporate profit.” 
Tim Jackson, similarly, recommends the stationary state, and dismisses those who argue that 
capitalism requires growth by pointing to capitalist economies—he cites 1990s Russia as an 
example—that do shrink, thereby demonstrating the possibility of stabilising “a fairly 
conventional capitalist economy” at zero growth. He concedes that the stationary state is an 
ambitious goal, but with a “change of heart,” an ethical commitment to frugality and “a 
healthy dose of repentance,” all buttressed by environmental regulation and guided by 
“bright young economists,” it is within our collective reach (Jackson 2009: 198, 239).5 Finally, 
in its ‘Great Transition’ report the Global Scenario Group, an environmental think tank, 
identifies Mill as the economist whose views are closest to recent thinking on transitions to a 
post-industrial society “based on human development rather than material acquisition” 
(Raskin et al.). It contrasts this Millian scenario, dubbed the ‘New Sustainability Paradigm,’ 
with a number of others, each of which is associated with a major economist: ‘Market Forces’ 
with Smith, ‘Policy Reform’ with Keynes, and ‘Breakdown’ with Malthus.  
Laissez-décroître; or, the hidden hand of diminishing returns  
 
Mill figures in the canon as the transitional figure between classical and neoclassical 
economics, and one reason for this is that he sought to cement the discipline’s scientific 
credentials by defining its methodology in positivist and utilitarian terms. Political economy 
is an “abstract science,” he would insist (2008: 45); it “is built upon hypotheses, strictly 
analogous to those which … are the foundation of the other abstract sciences” such as 
geometry. The parsimony required for rigorous hypothesis formation is appropriate to 
economics because it concerns itself with man 
 
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the 
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It makes entire abstraction of every other 
human passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually antagonizing 
                                                     
5  For the purposes of this essay I consider only the treatment of the ‘steady-state economy’ within the ‘Millian’ 
environmental tradition, but other strands of discussion exist. See e.g. Mann (2013). 
principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and desire of the present 
enjoyment of costly indulgences (Mill 2008: 41). 
 
Although economists recognise that economic behaviour is conditioned by a plurality of 
motives, all its forms “are considered by Political Economy as flowing solely from the desire 
of wealth” (Mill 2008: 41). 
 Some, such as Serge Latouche (1993: 74), read Mill to be proposing that “multifaceted 
life” itself be reduced to “the single dimension of economic interests expressed in the 
marketplace,” in the interests of shaping society into a “competitive machine.” This is 
somewhat unfair. Mill’s utilitarianism was more sophisticated than that of Bentham or 
Malthus, and was shaped by a richer and more liberal range of influences—from his partner 
and co-author Harriet Taylor’s radicalism to Saint Simon, Carlyle, Coleridge and German 
Romanticism. Nonetheless, his programme did contribute indirectly to the outcome 
identified by Latouche, by confirming the exclusion of the physical environment from the 
economic calculus—for if only the ability to produce ‘utility’ matters, the physical aspects of 
different goods lose all relevance—and in the implicit ideological support it affords the 
capitalist mode of production. On the latter, Mill makes four crucial moves. First, he divides 
the sphere of production from distribution, deeming the former—in positivist, Malthusian 
fashion—to be governed by laws that are natural and “quite independent of the social or 
other economic arrangements that are made to accommodate them.”6 They simply form a 
relationship between human beings and the objects of nature “which is fixed by what is 
physically possible between the two” (Fine 1982: 23). Second, although he does admit the 
operation of “social laws” in the sphere of distribution he omits from consideration the 
central aspect of distribution in capitalist society: of the means of production to the 
employing class. Third, he justifies the institution of private-property in social-contract terms 
as having been blessed “by mutual agreement” (Mill 2008: 42), and its actual division in 
utilitarian terms, in ‘labour justification’ terms (private property is a means of according to 
individuals the proceeds of their labour), and in straightforward contractual terms—that 
property transactions signed without physical coercion or trickery simply should be 
honoured.7 Fourth, he rejects Ricardo’s labour theory of value, replacing it with a conception 
of value that in effect reduces it to price. Profits, in his schema, arise from the employer’s 
own labour and “abstinence.” Wages are what an employer is prepared to pay for labour; 
their level reflects supply and demand. (Hence Mill’s recommendation of zero population 
growth as a method for raising the living standards of the masses.) 
 As regards the stationary state, Mill’s argument, as alluded to above, is that its 
arrival is inevitable. “When industrial progress ceases,” he asks (1994: 124), “in what 
condition are we to expect that it will leave mankind?” Cease it must, for it is self-evident 
that “the increase of wealth is not boundless,” that beyond “the progressive state lies the 
stationary state,” and that each advance moves us closer to that terminus. This “ultimate 
goal,” he continues, “is at all times near enough to be fully in view,” such that “we are 
always on the verge of it.” Yet then—tantalisingly—he remarks that “if we have not reached 
it long ago, it is because the goal itself flies before us.” Why does it fly so? Because the 
tendencies that propel its approach are counteracted by others. Inventions and innovations 
improve the techniques of production, the education and training of the workforce permits 
higher productivity, while an “overflow of capital” from rich countries to “the uncultivated 
or ill-cultivated regions of the earth” delays the saturation of capital in the former (Mill 1994: 
124-5). At this point in the argument one would expect Mill to pay serious consideration to 
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subtle distinction between the methods of the natural and social sciences, and later in life he partially resiled from his earlier 
positivism. 
7  Later in life he backtracked from the labour justification argument. See Medearis (2005). 
the question of whether the law of diminishing returns could be counterbalanced by 
tendencies of increasing returns, and whether consumerism and opportunities for capital 
export might expand instead of contract. But rather than pause to reflect upon these 
potential challenges to his historical dialectic, or whether the countervailing tendencies 
might be sufficiently weighty to indefinitely postpone the arrival of the stationary state, he 
merely restates that the latter is an “irresistible necessity.” 
These are by no means the only difficulties faced by Mill’s thesis. There is also the 
small matter of the ‘growth imperative.’ The theorisation of economic growth was a central 
concern for classical political economy. Smith set the tone, arguing that growth is self-
reinforcing, and it is good: it fulfils material needs, furthers human intercourse, and benefits 
society as a whole. Mill presents the most fully fledged of sceptical arguments, yet does not 
provide an explanation of the growth imperative. In passing, he alludes to one of its motors, 
geopolitical competition. “For the safety of national independence,” he declares, it is 
essential that a country’s productivity “should not fall much behind its neighbours.” But he 
fails to trace the implications of this insight for his thesis on the stationary state. Relatedly, 
he neglects either to provide an alternative explanation for the development of the ‘growth 
imperative’ or to consider the idea that capitalism is inherently a ‘growth economy,’ i.e. an 
economy that is systemically geared to growth. Yet Mill gives unqualified support to its 
basic institutions—wage labour, market exchange, and private property in the means of 
production—as well as to laissez faire and free trade. Every restriction upon market 
competition “is an evil,” he proclaims (1970: 142), and “every extension of it, even if for the 
time injuriously affecting some class of labourers, is always an ultimate good.”8 He doesn’t 
pause to ponder whether the “disagreeable symptoms” of the Ellenbogengesellschaft —the 
“trampling and elbowing” mentioned above—could be induced by that same free-market 
competition which elsewhere in the same book he defends to the hilt. Nor does he address 
the potential hazards that would in all likelihood confront the growth slowdown that he 
predicts. This is a serious omission, for it is evident that in a market society, as Boulding 
(1973: 89) has pointed out, 
 
there is a real danger that even the approach of a stationary state and the diminution of net 
investment could result in a very serious crisis of the kind which occurred in the United States 
between 1929 and 1932. What happened then was that a system of disequilibrating feedback 
got started. An initial decline in net investment reduced profits, which caused a further decline 
in net investment, which reduced profits further, and so on, until by 1932 net investment was 
practically zero and profits were negative. 
 
A final set of difficulties concern the latent tensions between Mill’s commitments to the 
stationary state, on the one hand, and to laissez-faire liberalism and individualism, on the 
other. As Mancur Olson has observed (1973: 8), no-growth societies would necessarily be 
characterised by a comparatively high degree of governmental or other collective action, 
with “stringent regulations and wide-ranging prohibitions against pollution and other 
external diseconomies.” Mill does not explore the participatory-democratic possibilities that 
a stationary state might afford, but does promote a number of authoritarian measures to 
enforce population control. Unlike most reformers, he defended the separation of spouses in 
workhouses, and he was prepared to countenance legislation “to forbid marriage unless the 
parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family” (Mill 1869, emphasis 
added; Reeves 2007: 209). But he pays no serious attention to the connections between his 
proposals for population control and his thesis on the stationary state, nor does he confront 
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antithetical to the ‘market forces’ model. 
the possible contradictions between his liberal-individualist commitments and the rationing, 
taxation and other policies that a stationary state would require. 
Mill’s blueprint, in short, comprises a knotty tangle of determinist and utopian 
argumentation, shot through with unexplored problems and contradictions. The 
determinism lies in his assumption that the projected falling rate of profit will act benignly, 
as a ‘hidden hand’ that brings the stationary state into being. The utopianism consists chiefly 
in his dismissal of the countervailing tendencies that he recognises were perpetually 
postponing its arrival, and his blithe disregard for the growth-promoting pressures of 
geopolitical and market competition. (In particular, István Mészáros (2008: 274) points out, 
Mill’s discussion of distribution fails to recognise that its fundamental feature is the 
“exclusive distribution of the means of production to the capitalist class”—a class that is 
constrained by market competition to prioritise economic growth over other considerations, 
whether human need or environmental limits.) More generally, Mill’s political-economic 
aspiration was to a stationary free-market semi-democratic socialism—where ‘socialism’ 
refers to the reform of capitalism rather than its overthrow (Reeves 2007: 466). As such, he is 
open to the charge of utopianism that Rosa Luxemburg levelled against the ‘liberal 
socialists’ of her day: that they imagined the malign social effects of capitalism could be 
abolished without suppressing the system itself (Burawoy 1990). 
 How do today’s advocates of a Millian stationary state relate to Mill’s own thesis? 
Essentially, they draw upon his critique of the Ellenbogengesellschaft and his liberal idealism 
while jettisoning the determinist argumentation. Hamilton’s Growth Fetish is a representative 
example. While sharing Mill’s final goal, he rejects the assertion that growth will die back of 
its own accord. This obliges him to explain its perdurability, which he does by way of the 
concept of a ‘growth imperative,’ or ‘fetish’. His book on the subject (2003: 16) proposes that 
the growth fetish is the product of “a social structure,” one that “skews the priorities of 
individuals,” promoting a form of false consciousness. Individuals’ preferences “do not 
develop ‘outside the system’; they are created and reinforced by the system, so that 
consumer sovereignty is a myth.” The question is therefore “not one of personal consumer 
choice versus elitist social engineering; it is one of corporate manipulation of consumer 
behaviour versus individuals in a society understanding what is in their real interests” 
(Hamilton 2003: 65). Hence, the growth fetish is the complement of a systemic socio-
economic drive to “the accumulation of wealth through profit seeking” (Hamilton 2003: 
119). But at this point Hamilton’s argument becomes circular. For he theorises the drive to 
accumulate capital as itself a product of “the core belief that human wellbeing is advanced 
above all else by increasing the quantity and quality of goods and services consumed by 
individuals”(Hamilton 2003: 119). The ‘engine’ of accumulation is nothing without its fuel: 
the productivist and consumerist ideology of growth. Individuals could and should elect to 
reject this mentality—for example, “a large proportion of the labour force can choose to 
work less” (Hamilton 2003: 237)—but they elect to remain trapped in the system. 
“Responding to the lures of the marketers, they choose the gilded cage and would prefer not 
to be told that the door is open” (Hamilton 2003: xiv). That individuals choose this system is 
in large part because of the structuration of choice, which itself is determined largely by ‘the 
marketers’ and other elite actors. This may be so, yet Hamilton then concludes (2003: 236) 
that “the distribution of power in society today” that accords such sway to those elite actors 
is itself “organised by… the growth fetish.” If ‘fetish’ is defined broadly, as having excessive 
regard for the power of something, Hamilton runs the risk of fetishising the growth fetish. 
 Tim Jackson’s case for a stationary state is constructed from related materials and 
suffers from similar shortcomings. Like Hamilton’s, his explanation of the persistence of 
economic growth relies upon circular argumentation: “The imperative to sell more goods, to 
innovate continually, to stimulate higher and higher levels of consumer demand”—i.e. the 
growth imperative—“is driven forwards by the pursuit of growth” (Jackson 2009: 97). And 
like Hamilton, he accords an extraordinary degree of autonomy to the ‘growth imperative’. 
It has, for example, 
 
shaped the architecture of the modern economy. It motivated the freedoms granted to the 
financial sector. It stood at least partly responsible for the loosening of regulations, the over-
extension of credit and the proliferation of unmanageable financial derivatives (Jackson 2009: 
21). 
 
 In the tradition of Mill, Hamilton and Jackson offer a critique of ‘actually existing 
capitalism’ while defending its core structures (wage labour, the market system, private 
property in the means of production) and rejecting any more radical proposals for its 
revolutionary transformation. Hamilton’s programme 
 
reaffirms a necessary role for public ownership, but it does not propose any expropriation of 
private property. It is anti-capitalist in the sense that it argues that society and governments 
should no longer cede special significance to the objectives or moral claims of the owners of 
capital (Hamilton 2003: 212). 
 
In its essentials, this is a restatement of Millian liberal socialism: a defence of the existing 
market system and distribution of property coupled with an honourable refusal to kowtow 
to vested interests and advocating a cultural revolution that resurrects “the middle-class 
virtues of moderation and frugality” (Hamilton, 2011: 44). Investment banks and hedge 
funds apart, few capitalist businesses are likely to object to anti-capitalism of this sort. 
Protected from the threat of expropriation, Hamilton’s manifesto would allow them to 
continue as before, plutocratically engineering the social and political order—growth 
imperative and all. 
Jackson’s prospectus is similar. He dismisses revolutionary political change—glibly, 
one might say—as nothing but a frenzied attempt to “tear down every institutional structure 
we can lay our hands on” (Jackson 2009: 172). He identifies pre-1990 Russia as an example of 
a “non-capitalist economy” that was in the grip of the growth drive. As such, it 
demonstrates the limitations of those who link the growth drive to the capitalist mode of 
production, but Jackson refrains from attending to arguments that theorised pre-1991 Russia 
as a form of state capitalism (Callinicos 1991; Dale 2004, 2011), and he cites Russia’s post-
1991 experience as proving that a capitalist economy can survive without growth, without 
referring either to the social catastrophe that unfolded under Yeltsin or to the question of 
whether degrowth on the international scale could replicate Russia’s national ‘success’ on 
this front. Nor does he confront the fact that an even more calamitous collapse in 1990s 
Russia was thwarted thanks to loans that were predicated on the prospect of a resumption in 
growth—not a few of which flowed into the hydrocarbons sector. For an economy to 
‘degrow’ over the longer run, interest payments must cease (for they require capital to 
expand), and the shock waves of this would self-evidently tear through the finance industry, 
the pensions industry, and beyond. Growth, as Ted Trainer recently remarked (2011), is not 
“like a faulty air conditioning unit, which can be taken away and the rest of the house will 
function more or less as it did before.” 
 In sum, it is fair to describe John Stuart Mill’s stationary state as a remarkable 
departure in classical political economy and a distinguished addition to the literature of 
utopia. But it fails to explore, let alone convincingly provide a pathogenesis of, capitalist 
society’s ‘growth pains.’ In this respect it is followed by latter-day Millians such as Daly, 
Jackson and Hamilton. They offer many sensible and not a few acute criticisms of the 
growth imperative but lack precision in locating its driving force, and rely too often upon 
circular argumentation and wishful thinking. If Mill’s legacy contains such manifest 
shortcomings in respect of the political economy of the environment, and lacks a critique of 
the growth paradigm, to what extent may this be said of his near-neighbour Karl Marx and 
his collaborator Friedrich Engels? 
Marx and Marxism: Beyond Prometheus and Pandora 
 
In terms of their influence on contemporary environmental debate, Marx and Engels have 
arrived later than Mill, but recent decades have witnessed a renaissance of Marxist 
ecological theory. Within this broad area of interest, I would like to pick out two currents. 
One, of which James O’Connor and Ted Benton are prominent representatives, identifies 
within the classical Marxist tradition a clash of ‘promethean’ and ‘eco-centric’ principles. On 
the ‘promethean’ side, Marx and Engels are said to have advocated the conquest of nature 
by man, a quest that they saw as indispensable to the onward march of human progress, as 
registered by the expansion of the ‘productive forces’—taken by some as a synonym for 
economic growth. Capitalism, they held, should be abolished on the grounds that it fetters 
the advance of the productive forces, for human society has a pressing interest in their 
‘unfettering’, a development that Communist society would enable and accelerate, without 
serious regard to the environmental costs this would entail. In O’Connor’s reading (1998: 
38), Engels was susceptible to “technological fetishism,” while Marx was guilty of ignoring 
the economic implications of thermodynamics—thus, he “brushed off Sergei Podolinsky, the 
first ecosocialist who thought that a specifically physical nature figures in value theory” 
(O’Connor 1998: 43, 122).9 Common to both Marx and Engels was a failure to place 
 
ecological destruction at the center of their theory of capitalist accumulation and socioeconomic 
change. They underestimated the extent to which the historical development of capitalism has 
been based on the exhaustion of resources and degradation of nature (O’Connor 1998: 124). 
 
Others have fleshed out the case. Ted Benton (1989), for example, diagnoses Marx and 
Engels as suffering from a “blindness to natural limits.” Daniel Bensaïd (n.d.) opines that 
their refusal to incorporate “notions of thresholds and limits” smacks of “Promethean 
arrogance,” adding that, carried away by the logic of their polemics against Malthus, they 
had “gambled on abundance as the solution to the world’s problems.” Similarly, Michael 
Löwy (in Foster, 2000: 135) charges that Marx adopted an “optimistic, ‘promethean’ 
conception of the limitless development of the productive forces,” a conception that is 
“totally indefensible … above all from the standpoint of the threat to the ecological balance 
of the planet.” 
 In an influential treatise, The Enemy of Nature (2007), Joel Kovel has extended the 
argument. Marx and Engels’ promethean productivism was, he maintains, was shared by 
“almost the entire socialist tradition, including those branches of it unburdened by 
Stalinism.” Almost without exception, socialists have failed to “appropriate an ecocentric 
attitude,” with many of them evincing an outright “enmity toward nature” (Kovel 2007: 
231). As examples he highlights Lenin and Trotsky, whose “worship of technology” was no 
less than “messianic.” In their utopia, 
 
a heroic Bolshevism redeems fallen humanity. The gruesome outcome is well known: After 
Stalin’s accession to power in 1927, … whatever democratic impulses had endured through the 
early period of the Bolshevik regime were jettisoned, and the entire might of Soviet society was 
concentrated on building the forces of production for all-out accumulation.10 
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“Trotsky’s musings were given an official imprimatur, even as he was driven out.” 
 There were exceptions to the rule, but they were few; Kovel (2007: 226) namechecks William 
Morris and Rosa Luxemburg. In Luxemburg’s case, he perceives in her sympathy with the 
suffering of animals an “authentically ecocentric way of being”—for example in her 
description of her feelings when witnessing guards beating a buffalo. 
 
The beast looked at me, the tears welled from my own eyes ... The suffering of a dearly beloved 
brother could hardly have moved me more profoundly than I was moved in my impotence in 
the face of this mute agony (in Kovel 2007: 226). 
 
When Luxemburg felt for the buffalo she was being receptive to its anguish. Marx, Engels 
and the Bolsheviks, by contrast, view nature—including animals—through Cartesian eyes, 
as inert matter to be understood solely as a resource available for appropriation by human 
labour. Failing to perceive the validity of a receptive attitude, their work is marred by a 
foreshortening of nature’s intrinsic value (Kovel 2007: 232-3). 
 O’Connor, Benton and Kovel find rich resources in the theorisation of human 
society’s relationship to nature by Marx and Engels and their followers, but they believe 
their method to be gravely damaged by an irreconcilable contradiction between its 
ecocentric and productivist/promethean commitments. Marx’s method therefore requires 
radical reconstructive surgery, a project that is exemplified by O’Connor’s ambitious 
reworking of Marx’s crisis theory. O’Connor (1998: 125, 307) bases his ecological crisis 
theory upon the concept of the conditions of production, defined “in Polanyi-like terms to 
include everything that is not produced as a commodity but that is treated as if it is a 
commodity.” These conditions of production—including nature, urban space and 
infrastructure, community and labour power—do not respond to the normal operation of 
the law of value, and responsibility for their supply, use and quality are typically assumed 
by states. Although Marx did analyse the degradation and despoliation of some of these 
conditions—notably the quality of soil—under capitalist conditions, he failed to consider 
that this might raise the costs of the elements of capital and thereby give rise to economic 
crisis. O’Connor (1998: 167) seeks to supplement and enrich Marx’s crisis theory by showing 
that capitalist relations, in undermining the natural conditions of production (“people and 
places and profits”), tend to produce crises of underconsumption and open up new 
possibilities for social transformation. 
 O’Connor’s thesis is a formidable exercise in the critical development of Marx’s 
work, but it is not without shortcomings. Some of these have been identified by Burkett and 
Bellamy Foster. The sharp line that O’Connor draws between barriers to accumulation that 
are ‘internal’ to capitalist production relations and those that follow from the degradation of 
nature is, suggests Burkett (1999b), exaggerated, even “artificial,” for the root of the 
destruction of nature and the exploitation of labour are at bottom one and the same. To this, 
Bellamy Foster adds two criticisms. One is that O’Connor attempts to push too much into 
the “locked box” of economic crisis theory and consequently downplays the “full 
dimensions of the ecological crisis and even of capitalism’s impact on the environment” 
(Bellamy Foster 2002). The other is that to assume that ecological degradation tends to 
undermine the accumulation process is to 
 
underestimate capitalism’s capacity to accumulate in the midst of the most blatant ecological 
destruction, to profit from environmental degradation, and to continue to destroy the earth to 
the point of no return. … In other words, the dangers of a deepening ecological problem are all 
the more serious because the system does not have an internal (or external) regulatory 
mechanism that causes it to reorganize. There is no ecological counterpart to the business cycle 
(Bellamy Foster 2002). 
 
 Bellamy Foster and Burkett are the most prominent representatives of an alternative 
approach to that developed by O’Connor, Benton and Kovel, one that regards the 
apparently ‘anti-ecological’ elements in classical Marxism as either the product of 
misinterpretation or as real flaws but of an ancillary nature, within a body of work that has 
an ‘ecological’ concern at its core. Rather than drastic reconstruction, for them the task that 
beckons Marxist scholarship is to engage in philological research to build a fine-grained 
picture of Marx and Engels’ ecological theory. In the process, they have sought to refute a 
number of empirical claims made by O’Connor and others—for example, that Marx failed to 
integrate into his economic analysis the new notions of energy and entropy that followed 
from the discovery of the first and second laws of thermodynamics.11 In my view, Foster and 
Burkett’s approach is the more persuasive, and in the rest of this essay I seek to add some 
points of detail, by way of analysis of the concepts of ‘Prometheanism,’ the ‘domination of 
nature’ and the ‘gamble on abundance,’ as well as ‘progress’ and the ‘productive forces.’ 
 To begin with the ‘Promethean’ relationship to nature that is attributed to Marx and 
Marxists, in its loose sense the attribution is uncontroversial, for it denotes a conception of 
human beings as a world-transforming species, one whose social activity manifests a 
continual striving to overcome its own limitations. The communist society to which Marx 
and Engels aspired was indeed predicated on an understanding of human beings as a needs-
expanding species, and Marx explicitly criticised the ‘Spartan’, levelling-down, communist 
alternative, for it sets itself “a definite, limited standard” (Hughes 2000: 183). It is also 
incontrovertible that their ‘promethean’ optimism at times bordered on the naïve—for 
example in the exuberant claim made by the young Engels (1844), in his first economic 
manuscript, that “the productivity of the soil can be increased ad infinitum by the application 
of capital, labour and science.” 
 That said, the charges of Bensaïd and Löwy, quoted above, are exaggerated. 
Consider the “gamble on abundance.” Marx’s best-known quote on the requirement of 
abundance is contained in his Critique of the Gotha Programme. It reads as follows. “When the 
individual is no longer subordinated within the division of labour,” and when labour 
 
has ceased to be merely a means of sustaining life and has become the prime necessity of life; 
when, in the train of the all-round development of individuals their productive powers have 
also increased and all the wellsprings of co-operative wealth flow more strongly—only then 
can … society inscribe on its banner: from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs! (Marx 1875). 
 
This is my own translation, for the standard one is misleading. It reads: “…when, together 
with the all-round development of the individual, the productive forces have also increased, 
and all the springs of social wealth flow abundantly—only then [etc.].” The differences are 
subtle but significant. In the original German the ‘productive powers’ cannot be understood 
as abstract forces but are unambiguously embodied in human beings, while abundant (or, to 
be precise, “more cooperatively wealthy”) production is a relative, not an absolute state, and 
is merely one of the preconditions of a communist society (cf. Hughes 2000). 
 The reason Marx and Engels stipulate that a relatively high level of ‘cooperative 
wealth’ is indispensable to the creation of a communist society is that it is a prerequisite for 
the implementation of the principle of distribution according to need. The ‘needs’ of which 
they speak are not reducible to material ‘urges,’ or to selfish or instrumental desires, or to 
                                                     
11  See Burkett (2006), and Foster Clark and York (2010: 59). Burkett shows that Marx and Engels took Podolinsky’s 
seriously, criticized its energy-reductionist elements, “pointed out the need to take fuller account of the depletion of non-
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‘basic needs’. They are not, the Analytical Marxist Jonathan Hughes (2000: 181) explains, 
“simply the conditions for the existence of human beings, but the conditions for their 
existence as human beings; the conditions for a recognisably human way of life.” A fully 
human existence requires the satisfaction of needs over and above the ‘basic’ needs of 
survival. Yet this, Hughes continues (2000: 188), is a matter 
 
not so much of what should be produced as how productive activity should be conducted. 
Marx’s resistance to an excessive emphasis on the satisfaction of basic needs arises not so much 
from a wish for increased material consumption as from concern about the distortion of human 
nature that occurs when human activity becomes a mere means to the satisfaction of ‘animal’ 
needs. 
 
Moreover, needs are understood in the wider context of human flourishing, which includes, 
and rests upon, our relationship with nature. 
 These reflections impinge upon our understanding of the ‘domination’ or ‘mastery’ 
of nature that Marx and Engels (and Lenin and Trotsky—and, if more crudely, Mill12) 
endorsed. The concepts have more than a hint of the macho but, as Reiner Grundmann 
observes (1991), they make sense “only with respect to interests and needs. … A society that 
does not take into account the repercussions of its transformation of nature can hardly be 
said to dominate nature at all.” Marx’s conception of the mastery of nature is one aspect of 
his notion of human flourishing and self-development, of humans unfolding their latent 
powers, and transforming themselves in the process of transforming nature. It refers, 
centrally, to the development of scientific method and technique that enable an enhanced 
understanding, recognition and acceptance of natural laws. As when the term mastery is 
applied to a virtuoso violinist, it denotes conscious and expert control, including of the 
limits of both performer and instrument. Likewise, the mastery of nature “does not mean 
that one behaves in a reckless fashion towards it, any more than we suggest that a masterly 
player dominates her violin when she hits it with a hammer” (Grundmann 1991). To give a 
concrete example, the ever-increasing emissions of greenhouse gases are a sign of a mastery 
so one-sided and short-sighted as to be akin to playing violin with hammer. Climate change 
represents a momentous example of humanity learning the laws of nature but failing to 
apply them judiciously, and reveals the potential for human society’s ability to control the 
natural environment to decrease, as the planet careers towards feedback-driven runaway 
warming. 
Far from exhibiting a cavalier desire for man to dominate nature in disregard of 
‘limits and thresholds,’ the scholarship of Bellamy Foster and Burkett, and also in many 
respects of Benton, O’Connor et al., reveals Marx and Engels to have exhibited “a deep 
concern for issues of ecological limits and sustainability” (Bellamy Foster 2000: 164). Far 
from being “unreceptive” to nature, Marx found it intolerable that “all creatures have been 
made into property: the fish in the water, the birds in the air, the plants on the earth” and 
urged that they too “must become free” (in Bellamy Foster 2000). His critique of alienation 
and his vision of the emancipatory content of the future communist society, as Benton points 
out (1992), “have as a central theme the full development of the aesthetic and spiritual 
dimensions of human relations to nature.” In Capital, Marx insists (in Bellamy Foster 2000: 
164) that the natural environment is a necessary part of wealth, which should be treated 
with the understanding that it is “the inalienable condition for the existence and 
reproduction of the chain of human generations.” He paid close attention to specific, 
empirical aspects of humanity’s interaction with its environment, arguing that cash crop 
production stands in contradiction to the nature of agriculture itself, concerned as the latter 
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is “with the whole gamut of permanent conditions of life” required by human beings 
through the ages (Marx, in Bellamy Foster 2000: 164). He was a sharp critic of the 
devastating effects of deforestation, of the unsustainable way in which agricultural 
production is organised, and of the colossal and unnecessary wastefulness of manufacturing 
industry. His anthropology is based upon the premise that humans fashion their 
relationship to external nature through the production of their means of subsistence. As 
Grundmann (1991) reminds us, Marx employs the concept of ‘metabolism’ to define the 
labour process: “a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his 
own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and 
nature”—a metabolism the disruption of which could spell disaster. 
Similar points can be made with regard to Lenin and Trotsky. Presiding over a 
besieged, backward and impoverished country they inclined to a rather rose-tinted view of 
technological developments in the West, yet their inclusion on Kovel’s blacklist of ‘Enemies 
of Nature’ is surely a case of mistaken identity. Kovel’s charge sheet places a particular 
emphasis upon the ability of this or that Marxist personage to empathise with animals. To 
this author, it seems exaggerated, even if the general principle is persuasive—that empathy 
with fellow creatures is an important human capacity, and that the Taylorisation of animal 
husbandry exacerbates our alienation from the natural world, fostering ignorant and 
sentimental attitudes at the expense of empathy (Dickens 1996: 62ff; Berger 2009). If this 
principle is held as the standard of judgment, Lenin and particularly Trotsky may be found 
guilty of possessing a naïve faith in the benefits of agricultural mechanisation and 
standardisation, yet they appear much more ‘receptive’ to the natural world than Kovel 
allows. Trotsky was a connoisseur of nature, knowledgeable about the rarest of plants, and, 
in his Mexican exile, dutifully tending to the rabbits and chickens in the back yard 
(Deutscher 2003). Lenin’s acquaintance with the ways of nature, and agricultural technique 
in particular, was remarkable. He appears “genuinely to have loved nature” and felt 
comfortable in the wild; there was little that he enjoyed more than long walks in the country 
(Weiner 2000: 23). More importantly, the government that he and Trotsky led, as Douglas 
Weiner (2000) has detailed, was committed to establishing conservation areas (in which 
shooting, harvesting, mining, woodcutting and tourism were all prohibited) and to 
promoting the study of conservation and the environment in Russia’s schools. 
 But of the figures under discussion in this essay it was Engels who was most 
concerned and conversant with environmental issues. He inveighed repeatedly against the 
“squandering” of natural resources and warned, in an oft-quoted passage from the Dialectics 
of Nature (Engels 1876), of the unintended ecological consequences that result from social 
structures that reward short-term gain at the expense of other considerations. 
 
What cared the Spanish planters in Cuba, who burned down forests on the slopes of the 
mountains and obtained from the ashes sufficient fertiliser for one generation of very highly 
profitable coffee trees—what cared they that the heavy tropical rainfall afterwards washed 
away the unprotected upper stratum of the soil, leaving behind only bare rock! In relation to 
nature, as to society, the present mode of production is predominantly concerned only about 
the immediate, the most tangible result; and then surprise is expressed that the more remote 
effects of actions directed to this end turn out to be quite different. 
 
The same text also contains a celebrated passage that admonishes those who conceive of 
nature as something to be conquered. 
 
Let us not flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human conquest over nature. For each 
such conquest takes its revenge on us. … At every step we are reminded that we by no means 
rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people … but that we … belong to nature, and 
exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage 
… of being able to know and correctly apply its laws. 
 
Far from celebrating Prometheanism Engels is warning of its potential blowback—the evils 
that in Ancient Greek mythology are visited upon the world through Pandora’s urn, in 
punishment of Prometheus. If Prometheus symbolises a ‘productivist’ wager on 
technological advance and Pandora’s box its Romantic negation, Marx and Engels’ 
philosophy of progress attempts to go through and beyond both, in a dialectical Aufhebung. 
 Let us examine this dialectic of progress in more detail. There are few better places to 
begin than Denis Mäder’s meticulously documented and analysed Fortschritt bei Marx. 
Mäder (2010: 31, 122, 30 and passim) provides philological confirmation that Marx and 
Engels held a progress-regress model, with progress categorised as a “good,” and did not 
construe progress as the march of history, comprising both ‘light and dark’ sides. (A classic 
example of the latter interpretation is Ronald Wright’s thesis (2004) that “Progress has an 
internal logic that can lead beyond reason to catastrophe.”13) Although certain of Marx’s 
remarks can be read as supporting just such an ‘ambivalence’ model, it would be a mistake 
to do so, Mäder argues. For example, where Marx ventures that the “anarchy of production, 
… the source of so much misery, is at the same time the source of so much progress” there is 
no question that misery and progress, despite their common source, are distinct (Mäder 
2010: 107). Similarly, where he describes human progress under capitalism as resembling 
“that hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain” 
(Marx 1853) the metaphor presents the nectar as independent of the massacre and not its 
cause. (Nectar, after all, is not normally drunk from skulls.) 
 Historical progress, for Marx and Engels, is conceived in terms of the development of 
human beings as a social and natural species. The objective of social production should be 
“the human being,” including “the working-out of his creative potentialities,” and “human 
mastery over the forces of nature” (those of “so-called nature as well as of humanity’s own 
nature”). The purpose of production, in this prospectus (Marx 1857-8), is not mere material 
goods but “the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc.” 
Marx (1857-8) contrasts these goals with what would nowadays be called the ‘growth fetish’ 
that develops within capitalist society, characterised by the appearance of production “as 
the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of production” and the experience of the process 
of production as “total alienation,” a society in which concrete human labour, and therefore 
human life activity and creativity itself, is subjected “to an entirely external end”—the 
abstract drive to expand exchange value. 
 According to Mäder (2010: 324), Marx and Engels identify two key criteria in their 
definition of human progress. One is ‘politics’, including social movements and political 
consciousness, i.e. human beings’ recognition of their collective power to strategically 
intervene in the course of their history. The other is the development of productive forces. 
This concept is treated in the theory of historical materialism as non-problematic, and in 
Marx’s analysis of capitalism he does tend to assume productive forces development to be 
roughly synonymous with an increase in labour productivity, but it is a term with a variety 
of referents, and cannot be equated with material economic growth (Hughes 2000). 
Essentially, it denotes the ways in which human beings work upon nature, developing their 
capacities and producing goods and services to fulfil their needs and wants. It refers to 
workers, their skills, knowledge and techniques, their ability to cooperate and their scientific 
knowledge, the technologies they deploy and the resources and other conditions they find in 
the natural environment (Marx 1976). Together, these determine the productivity of social 
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labour, and its ability to deploy natural resources to human ends. Insofar as the term can 
meaningfully be applied to raw materials and energy, it refers to “the discovery of new 
resources, of techniques to increase the viability of marginal deposits, and of new uses to 
which raw materials can be put,” rather than to the extraction of resources per se (Hughes 
2000: 126). 
 At the most general level, Marx and Engels applaud the development of human 
capacities, including the productive forces. They conceive of human beings as developing, 
needs-producing creatures, with human nature seen as a process of overcoming and 
transcending its own limitations through social activity. The development of the productive 
forces, even under capitalism, enhances human potential; for example, the expansion of 
knowledge and science enables an improved understanding of society and nature as well 
the possibility to engage in critical research (Mäder 2010: 324). Under capitalism, however, 
the productive forces received “a one-sided development only, and became for the majority 
destructive forces,” as Marx and Engels (1845) phrased it. Alongside the impressive 
“industrial and scientific forces” that capitalism has summoned into being, there exist 
simultaneously 
 
symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors of the latter times of the Roman Empire. In our 
days, everything seems pregnant with its contrary: Machinery, gifted with the wonderful 
power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it. 
The newfangled sources of wealth, by some strange, weird spell, are turned into sources of 
want. … At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to 
other men or to his own infamy. … This antagonism between the productive forces and the 
social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted 
(Marx, in Klingender 1943). 
 
According to this infernal dialectic, even the mastery of nature turns into its opposite. 
“All progress in capitalist agriculture,” as Marx puts it in Capital Volume One, 
 
is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the workers, but of robbing the soil; all progress in 
increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a progress towards ruining the more long-
lasting sources of that fertility. . . . Capitalist production, therefore, only develops the 
techniques and the degree of combination of the social process of production by 
simultaneously undermining the original sources of all wealth—the soil and the workers 
(Marx, in Moore 2000: 127). 
 
 These arguments are central to Marx and Engels’ prognosis for social transformation. 
The development of the productive forces not only enhances the capacity of human beings 
to freely and collectively determine their fate but also, by entering into contradiction with 
the relations of production, yields the possibility of social revolution. The insistence upon 
the role of productive forces development in preparing the ground for communism, 
however, has attracted more than a little criticism. It is suggested that the claim that 
capitalist relations of production fetter the development of productive forces entails an 
argument that people have an interest in their ‘unfettered’ development regardless of the 
environmental costs involved. But this interpretation involves an indefensible distortion of 
Marx and Engels’ case. For the motivating interest that they ascribe to people in replacing 
capitalism with communism is an interest in their own welfare, and that of human society 
generally. As I argued above, there is no reason to ascribe to them the view that communism 
would or should engage in ecologically damaging processes. Likewise, their enthusiasm for 
the expansion of human needs and powers is perfectly compatible with a reduction in 
resource use (Hughes 2000: 143). Indeed, in the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels insist 
that the productive forces had already reached the stage at which their desired transition of 
mode of production could succeed—in 1848! 
Demeter’s mistaken identity: Marx, Engels and the growth paradigm 
 
Marx and Engels’ critique of capitalism is commonly depicted as ‘productivist’ in character, 
in that it putatively centres on the system’s failure to maximise output in a balanced way. As 
outlined above, the reasons to dissent from this depiction are many. But I would go further, 
and would suggest that their theory contains a critique of what is nowadays called the 
‘growth paradigm.’14 Fundamentally, the growth paradigm is the idea that economic growth 
is good, imperative, essentially limitless, and a matter of pressing concern for society as a whole. In 
addition, it relies upon two flanking assumptions that may appear self-evident but should 
nonetheless be stated: that ‘an economy’ exists as a definite entity, occupying a distinct 
dimension of society within which processes occur that can be meaningfully understood as 
parts of an articulated assemblage, rather than as a congeries of unrelated acts; and that 
aggregated ‘economic’ activities have in common some quantifiable substance that can be 
measured in order to ascertain whether ‘the economy’ is or is not growing. All of these 
aspects of the growth paradigm are subjected to critique by Marx and Engels. Although they 
lived before the term ‘economic growth’ had entered the lexicon and before the growth 
paradigm had achieved its complete form, a trenchant critique of it can be assembled from 
their writings, in particular from their analysis of capital’s imperative to the relentless 
expansion of production for its own sake. 
The axial concept in Marx’s theory of capitalism is the contradiction between wealth 
(use value—anything that satisfies human needs) and its alienated form under capitalist 
conditions (value). He wasn’t the first to identify contradictory aspects of this relationship. 
For example the Earl of Lauderdale noted the paradox that an increase in the scarcity of a 
good such as water would enhance ‘private riches’ (exchange values) at the expense of the 
common wealth (Bellamy Foster, Clark and York 2010: 55). But Marx was able to “make the 
Lauderdale paradox his own” by analysing generalised commodity production 
simultaneously in terms of value relations and material processes (Bellamy Foster, Clark and 
York 2010: 59). 
Marx’s value analysis provides a systematic diagnosis of the commensurability of 
value. In his theory, the substance of value is abstract labour; its measure is socially 
necessary labour time; its form of appearance is money. Through being exchanged, 
commodities are rendered commensurable: they “acquire a socially uniform status as values, 
which is distinct from their sensuously varied objectivity as articles of utility” (Marx 1976). 
In capitalist economies value relations prevail, such that unrelated acts are reduced to their 
exchange value and rendered commensurable, with value expansion being the goal of 
production. Whereas the classical economists took it as given that production is necessarily 
oriented to consumption, Marx, on the basis of his theory of value form, held that in 
capitalist production “what matters is not the immediate use-value but the exchange-value, 
and, in particular, the expansion of surplus-value.” This is its driving force—and “it is a 
pretty conception that—in order to reason away the contradictions of capitalist production—
abstracts from its very basis and depicts it as production aiming at the direct satisfaction” of 
consumers (Marx, in Keen 2001). In this theory, competition drives capitals to expand, as if 
by coercive law. The heart of the accumulation process, as Colin Barker summarises Marx’s 
argument, 
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is the continuous extraction of surplus labour using ever new methods, a process fuelled by the 
competitive relations existing among the various centres or units of accumulation, and 
constantly resisted by those subjected to it (Barker and Dale 1998). 
 
The compulsive relationship between these two processes, competition and exploitation, 
provides the clue to understanding the singularly dynamic, crisis-ridden and 
environmentally damaging character of capitalism. 
In a general sense, Marx (1992: 323) sees the basic contradiction of capitalist 
accumulation as that between the drive to the “absolute development of the productive 
forces, without regard to exchange value” and the imperative to “preserve existing exchange 
value.” The first of these phrases may seem to endorse something akin to the growth 
paradigm, but the appearance deceives. As we saw above, Marx does not see the 
development of the productive forces as an unqualified good. Moreover, the paragraph that 
follows makes a clear distinction between two goals of production: capital accumulation, 
and social wellbeing. 
 
Capital and its self-expansion appear as … the motive and the purpose of production; 
production is only production for capital and not vice versa, the means of production are not 
mere means for a constant expansion of the living process of the society of producers. … The 
means—unconditional development of the productive forces of society—comes continually 
into conflict with the limited purpose, the self-expansion of the existing capital (Marx 1894). 
 
Placed in this context, the phrase that appears to support the absolute development of the 
productive forces, giving grist to those who accuse Marx of ‘productivism,’ reveals itself to 
be an aspect of a critique of capitalist economy for its growth fetishism. 
The same insight—into the contradiction between use value and exchange value in a 
commodity-based system—upon which Marx and Engels’s crisis theory is constructed also 
forms the kernel of their critique of humanity’s relationship with nature in the capitalist 
mode of production. In their analysis values, expressed in money prices, are “homogenous, 
divisible, mobile, reversible, and quantitatively unlimited,” in contrast to use values, which 
exist concretely as matter and energy in specific space and time and “exhibit qualitative 
variety, indivisibility, locational uniqueness, irreversibility and quantitative limits” (Burkett 
2006: 168). The imperative of value expansion entails the subordination of the latter beneath 
the former, with profound implications both for the dynamics of capitalism and for the 
relationship between humanity and nature. Capital in Marx’s theory, as Kovel (2007) points 
out, “is quantitative in its core, and imposes the regime of quantity upon the world.” 
Because the paramount purpose of capitalist production is value expansion, use values 
(including land, raw materials, fuels and other natural resources) are treated simply as 
inputs contributory to that end, and their depletion and degradation do not show up on the 
bottom line. “Because individual capitalists are engaged in production and exchange for the 
sake of the immediate profit,” as Engels reasoned (1876), 
 
only the nearest, most immediate results must first be taken into account. As long as the 
individual manufacturer or merchant sells a manufactured or purchased commodity with the 
usual coveted profit, he is satisfied and does not concern himself with what afterwards 
becomes of the commodity and its purchasers. The same thing applies to the natural effects of 
the same actions. 
 
In pursuit of surplus value, capitals are obliged to continually raise the rate either of 
absolute surplus value (by expanding production, cutting wages, lengthening the working 
day) or of relative surplus value (eg. by investing in new machines or other technology, or 
purchasing cheaper raw materials). Not only is a historically unsurpassed proportion of 
surplus product ploughed back into advancing productivity, but the scale of production 
tends to increase too. Capital accumulation brings in its wake 
 
an ever more detailed subdivision of labour, an ever greater improvement of old machines, and 
a constant application of new machinery—a process which goes on uninterruptedly, with 
feverish haste, and upon an ever more gigantic scale (Marx 1847). 
 
In short, Marx’s political economy is intrinsically bound up with ecological processes. His 
argument is not only that human alienation from nature “is intrinsic to value’s formal 
abstraction from use value,” in Burkett’s compressed formulation (in Williams 2010: 195), 
but also that “the value form of wealth by definition imbues production with an expansive 
character.” Sustaining the process of capital self-expansion tends to require increasing 
supplies of natural materials and energy. In Capital, Marx shows that it was capitalist 
production relations, specifically the separation of workers from control over the tools of 
production, that enabled and encouraged the large-scale use of machinery (such as steam 
engines), a trend that synergised with the discovery of the fossil fuels by which they could 
be continuously powered (Keefer 2010; Burkett 2006). 
 In these ways, Marx and Engels provide a critical theory of capitalism’s growth 
imperative and of its tendency to render commensurable (and hence quantifiable) 
heterogenous economic processes. Yet they also advanced explanations of two additional 
elements of the growth paradigm: the notion that ‘the economy’ exists as a distinct sphere, 
and the fetish character of economic processes. They explain the first of these by reference to 
the exploitation relation that prevails in capitalism, the unique quality of which is that it is 
enforced primarily through the effect of propertylessness on the workers’ ‘voluntary’ 
decision to hire out their labour-power rather than by direct coercion within structures of 
personal obligation or ownership. With marketisation there evolved a contractually-
mediated ‘private’ realm, a separately institutionalised ‘economic’ sphere for the production 
and exchange of goods and services. Coeval and concomitant with this development, state 
power was reconstituted as if partitioned within its own space distinct from civil society—
the ‘political state.’ 
The second, commodity fetishism, refers to the way in which economic processes, 
although fundamentally social relations between people, assume the appearance of objective 
necessity, due to the way in which social labour is mediated through market exchange. The 
upshot is that relations between people assume the illusory form of relationships between 
things, with markets appearing to gain an objective power that dominates the lives of 
individuals. With the determination of economic processes by exchange value appearing in 
this way as a natural fact, capital accumulation, and with it economic growth, comes to 
appear as essentially infinite and eternal. These two social phenomena—commodity 
fetishism and the institutional separation of politics from economics—combine to create a 
potent ideological impression: that the core dynamic of capitalist society, the accumulation 
drive, is not human-created but pulses, naturally, from ‘the economy.’ Capital accumulation 
and economic growth assume the guise of natural processes, such that their endpoint would 
connote the termination of humanity itself—an apocalyptic Menschheitsdämmerung, in Elmar 
Altvater’s apt phrase (2005: 27). 
Let me summarise the main argument. To interpret Marx and Engels as exponents of 
a ‘promethean’ productivism is an error. It is to mistake Prometheus for his first cousin and 
goddess of the harvest, Demeter.15 For the cornucopia that is Marx and Engels’ goal cannot 
be achieved by promethean means—trickery, theft and the exploitation of fire (or its low-
entropy hydrocarbon analogues). It is not an impossible abundance the pursuit of which will 
                                                     
15  ‘Prometheus’ and ‘cornucopia’ are commonly conflated as symbols of an optimistic or rapacious relationship to the 
environment, but a distinction between the two can usefully be made. See e.g. Speth (2008); Hornborg (2001). 
smash nature’s limits and release Pandora’s evils into the world. Rather, it is a realisable 
future geared to the satisfaction of human needs, created by human social labour, with 
solidaristic political consciousness as precondition and midwife. From this vantage point, 
Marx and Engels’ aspiration towards ‘abundance’ appears neither as techno-fetishising 
hubris nor as arrogance towards nature’s limits, but is based rather on a valid recognition: 
that natural resources are appraised and engaged with by human beings politically and 
sociologically; that is to say, with particular social purposes and objectives that are 
inherently open to change. To aspire to a state of abundance—if I may adapt Harvey’s (1996: 
147) rebuttal of Malthus—is to maintain that human beings have the will, wit, and capacity 
to develop our state of knowledge, alter our social goals and technological mixes, to modify 
our material economic practices in accordance with the needs of humanity and of the 
biosphere. 
Conclusion 
 
In this essay I introduce and critique the views of John Stuart Mill, regarded by some as “the 
first ‘green’ economist” (Reeves 2007: 233) and suggest that despite their ‘productivist’ 
reputation the work of Marx and Engels provides insight into environmental political 
economy that remains useful today. There is no need to repeat that discussion, but in 
concluding I shall make one further observation. The contemporary publications by the 
Marxists discussed above, by and large, are characterised by a concern to elucidate real-
world processes or to contribute to contemporary debates while at the same time showing a 
willingness to carefully parse the opus of their tradition’s founders. Some Millians—notably 
Amartya Sen—have evinced a similar inclination to subject the work of their nineteenth-
century forebear to critical scrutiny, but the same cannot be said of those who take their cue 
from Mill’s stationary state.16 An apposite recent example is contained in a book by Daly 
(2007: 62) in which he professes “to show that ecological economics has deep historical roots 
in classical economics (Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and especially John 
Stuart Mill)” but does nothing of the sort. 
There are various reasons why Marxists tend to show a greater awareness of the 
work of their forebears than do Millians. Unlike the liberal tradition, theirs is—as the name 
suggests—highly indebted to one or two individuals. An additional factor may be that 
Marxists have the good fortune (in this regard) to find themselves positioned outside the 
mainstream. Such circumstances tend to stimulate closer investigation of intellectual 
genealogy. To give a salient example, Marx and Engels provided a prognosis of the 
transition to communism that comprised logics of ‘structure’ (including the ‘tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall’) as well as ‘agency’ (class struggle, social movements). That communism 
never arrived prompted critics to vigorously press their contemporary followers to account 
for this apparent contradiction of the theory, upon which a voluminous literature arose that 
has greatly enriched their understanding not only of the matter at hand but of much else 
besides—and the debates discussed in this essay should be seen within that wider context. 
Compare this to Mill. He provided a prediction of a transition to the stationary state, one 
that comprised logics of ‘structure’ (diminishing returns) combined with ethical preferences 
(for higher living standards, the contemplation of nature, etc.). When the utopia failed to 
appear, at most a handful of critics recommended that his followers account for the apparent 
contradiction in the theory, and no large literature arose. Instead, numerous Millians 
continue to cite his nineteenth-century blueprint as if it has been unfurled on our breakfast 
tables in pristine condition. Some further critical inquiry would not go amiss. 
                                                     
16  Sen has engaged in detail with the work of Mill, but not on the question of the stationary state. E.g. Sen (2006). 
REFERENCES 
 
Altvater, E. (1993), The Future of the Market, (London: Verso). 
Altvater, E. (2005), Das Ende des Kapitalismus, wie wir ihn kennen: Eine radikale 
Kapitalismuskritik, (Westfälisches Dampfboot). 
Angus, I. and Butler, S. (2011), Too Many People? Population, Immigration, and the 
Environmental Crisis, (Haymarket). 
Barker, C. and Dale, G. (1998), ‘Protest Waves in Western Europe; A Critique of “New Social 
Movement Theory,”’ Critical Sociology, 25 (1–2). 
Bellamy Foster, J. (2002), ‘Capitalism and Ecology: The nature of the contradiction,’ 
http://monthlyreview.org/2002/09/01/capitalism-and-ecology 
Bellamy Foster, J. (2000), Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, (New York: Monthly Review 
Press). 
Bellamy Foster, J., Clark, B., and York, R. (2010), The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s war on the 
Earth, (New York: Monthly Review Press). 
Bensaïd, D. (n.d.), ‘Marxisms, Theory, Yesterday and Today,’ 
www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1929  
Benton, T., ed. (1996), The Greening of Marxism, (New York: Guilford).  
Benton, T. (1989), ‘Marxism and natural limits: An ecological critique and reconstruction,’ New 
Left Review I/178. 
Benton, T. (1992), ‘Ecology, Socialism and the Mastery of Nature: A reply to Reiner Grundmann,’ 
New Left Review I/194. 
Berger, J. (2009), About Looking, (Bloomsbury Publishing). 
Bond, P. (2011), Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below, (University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press). 
Boulding, K. (1973), ‘The Shadow of the Stationary State,’ Daedalus 102(4). 
Burawoy, M. (1990), ‘Marxism as Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth,’ 
American Sociological Review 55: 775-793. 
Burkett, P. (1999a), Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective, (Palgrave). 
Burkett, P. (1999b), ‘Fusing Red and Green,’ Monthly Review, 
http://monthlyreview.org/1999/02/01/fusing-red-and-green 
Burkett, P, (2009), Marxism and Ecological Economics, (Brill). 
Callinicos, A. (1991), The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions, 
(Cambridge: Polity). 
Collini, S. (1993), Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Dale, G. (2004), Between State Capitalism and Globalisation: The Collapse of the East German 
Economy, (Peter Lang). 
Dale, G. (2011), ‘The transition in Central and Eastern Europe,’ in Gareth Dale, ed., First the 
Transition, then the Crash: Eastern Europe in the 2000s, (London: Pluto Press). 
Dale, G. (2012a), ‘The Growth Paradigm: A critique,’ International Socialism, Issue 134 
www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=798&issue=134 
Dale, G. (2012b), ‘Adam Smith’s Green Thumb and Malthus’ Three Horsemen: Cautionary tales 
from classical political economy,’ Journal of Economic Issues, December. 
Daly, H. (1977), Steady-State Economics, (W.H. Freeman). 
Daly, H. (2007), Ecological Economics and Sustainable Development, Selected Essays of Herman 
Daly, (Edward Elgar). 
Deutscher, I. (2003), The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929-1940, (London: Verso). 
Dickens, P. (1996), Reconstructing Nature: Alienation, emancipation and the division of labour, 
(London: Routledge). 
Engels, F. (1844), ‘Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy,’ Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/df-jahrbucher/outlines.htm 
Engels, F. (1876), Dialectics of Nature, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-
played-labour/index.htm 
Escobar, A. (1995), Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, 
(Princeton University Press). 
Fine, B. (1982), Theories of the Capitalist Economy, (Edward Arnold). 
Ginsborg, P. (2008), Democracy: Crisis and Renewal, (Profile Books). 
Grundmann, R. (1991), ‘The Ecological Challenge to Marxism,’ New Left Review I/187. 
Hamilton, C. (2003), Growth Fetish, (Allen & Unwin). 
Hamilton, C. (2011), Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth about Climate Change. 
(London: Earthscan). 
Hamilton, C. and Denniss, R. (2005), Affluenza: When too much is never enough, (Crow’s Nest: 
Allen & Unwin). 
Harvey, D. (1996), Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Hornborg, A. (2001), The Power of the Machine: Global inequalities of economy, technology, and 
environment, (AltaMira Press). 
Hughes, J. (2000), Ecology and Historical Materialism, (Cambridge University Press). 
Jackson, T. (2009), Prosperity Without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet, (London: 
Earthscan). 
Keefer, T. (2010), ‘Machinery and Motive Power: Energy as a substitute for and enhancer of 
human labor,’ in Kolya Abramsky, ed, Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution: Social struggles 
in the transition to a post-petrol world, (Oakland: AK Press). 
Keen, S. (2001), Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences, (Annandale: 
Pluto Press). 
Klingender, F.D. (1943), Marxism and Modern Art: An approach to social realism, 
www.marxists.org/subject/art/lit_crit/klingender/ch05.htm 
Koch, M. (2011), Capitalism and Climate Change: Theoretical Discussion, Historical Development 
and Policy Responses, (Palgrave). 
Kovel, J. (2007), The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World? 2nd edn, 
(London: Zed). 
Latouche, S. (1993), In the Wake of the Affluent Society: An exploration of post-development, 
(London: Zed Books). 
Mäder, D. (2010), Fortschritt bei Marx, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag). 
Malthus, T. (1989a [1803]), An Essay on the Principle of Population, Vol. 1, edited by Patricia 
James, (Cambridge University Press). 
Malthus, T. (1989b [1803]), An Essay on the Principle of Population, Vol. 2, edited by Patricia 
James, (Cambridge University Press). 
Mann, M. (2013), ‘The End May Be Nigh, But For Whom?,’ in Georgi Derluguian, ed., Does 
Capitalism Have a Future?  (Yale University Press). 
Marx, K. (1847), Wage Labour and Capital, 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/ch09.htm 
Marx, K. (1853), ‘The Future Results of the British Rule in India,’ 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/07/22.htm 
Marx, K. (1857-8), Grundrisse 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch09.htm 
Marx, K. (1875), Critique of the Gotha Programme, 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/index.htm 
Marx, K. (1976), Capital, Vol.1, (Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
Marx, K. (1894), Capital, Vol. 3, Part III, Chapter 15 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch15.htm 
Marx, K. (1992), MEGA, II 4.2, (Berlin: Dietz). 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1845), The German Ideology, 
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01c.htm 
Meadows, D., Meadows, D., Randers, J., and Behrens, W. (1972), The Limits to Growth: A 
report for the Club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind, (Washington D.C.: Potomac 
Associates). 
Medearis, J. (2005), ‘Labor, Democracy, Utility, and Mill’s Critique of Private Property,’ American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 1. 
Merchant, C. (1992), Radical Ecology: The search for a livable world, (London: Routledge). 
Mészáros, I. (2008), The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time: Socialism in the Twenty-First 
Century, (New York: Monthly Review Press). 
Mill, J. S. (1869), On Liberty, www.utilitarianism.com/ol/five.html 
Mill, J. S. (1904 [1874]), On Nature, www.lancs.ac.uk/users/philosophy/texts/mill_on.htm 
Mill, J. S. (1909 [1873]), Autobiography, (P.F. Collier). 
Mill, J. S. (1970 [1848]), Principles of Political Economy, Books IV and V, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin). 
Mill, J. S. (1994 [1848]), Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism, ed by Jonathan 
Riley, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Mill, J. S. (2008 [1836]), ‘On the Definition and Method of Political Economy,’ in Hausman, 
Daniel, ed., The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, (Cambridge University Press). 
Moore, J. (2000), Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-historical perspective, 
www.jasonwmoore.com/uploads/Moore__Environmental_Crises___the_Metabolic_Rift__O_E__20
00_.pdf 
Neale, J. (2008), Stop Global Warming: Change the World, (London: Bookmarks). 
O’Connor, J. (1998), Natural Causes; Essays in Ecological Marxism, (New York: Guilford). 
Olson, M. (1973), ‘Introduction,’ Daedalus, 102(4). 
Postone, M. (1993), Time, Labor and Social Domination: A reinterpretation of Marx’s critical 
theory, (Cambridge University Press). 
Purdey, S. (2010), Economic Growth, the Environment and International Relations, (London: 
Routledge). 
Radt, P. (2010), Fetisch Wachstum: Philosophisch-ökonomische Anmerkungen zur Logik des 
Kapitalismus, (ISP Verlag). 
Raskin, P. et al. (2002), Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead, (Boston: 
Stockholm Environment Institute). 
Reeves, R. (2007), John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand, (Atlantic). 
Rest, J. (2011),, Grüner Kapitalismus? Klimwandel, globale Staaten-konkurrenz und die 
Verhinderung der Energiewende, (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). 
Ricardo, D. (1973), The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (London: J. M. Dent). 
Rist, G. (2011), The Delusions of Economics: The misguided certainties of a hazardous science, 
(London: Zed Books). 
Sen, A. (2006), ‘Reason, Freedom and Well-being,’ Utilitas, Vol. 18, Issue 1, pp.80-96. 
Smith, A. (1993 [1776]), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (Oxford 
University Press). 
Speth, J. G. (2008), The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the environment, and Crossing 
from Crisis to Sustainability, (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
Trainer, T. (2011), ‘The radical implications of a zero growth economy,’ Real-World Economics 
Review, No. 57. 
Weiner, D. (2000), Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet 
Russia, (Pittsburgh University Press). 
Williams, C. (2010), Ecology and Socialism, (Haymarket). 
Wolin, S. (1960), Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, 
(Boston: Little, Brown). 
Wright, R. (2004), A Short History of Progress, (Edinburgh: Canongate). 
